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In this article we will vividly discus the Partition of India: Policy and Proposal.
Introduction to Partition of India during British Rule:
In 1939, Second World War broke out and with that Congress Ministries resigned as a matter of protest against British government’s decision to make ‘India a participant in war without consulting Indian public opinion. In this way the system established by the Act of 1935 which had remained in operation hardly for a period of 2 years collapsed.
Efforts were, thus, made to replace the old with a new system. But as expected the task was not easy. To establish a new system is always difficult, but it became still more difficult because Indian leadership was in no mood to co-operate with the British authorities in their war efforts.
Then the British government was very busy in the war and had no time to properly attend to the demands of Indian leaders for constitutional reforms on the one hand and to appreciate their view point on the other. All that the British government wanted was that Indians should extend their unqualified support to it and that their demands should be negotiated after the war was over.
On the other hand, Indians were not prepared to trust good faith of the British government. They still remembered their giving unqualified support to the British government during World War I and in return they had got, Jallianwala Bagh tragedy. Thus, British sense of justice about which Gandhiji had full faith was non-existent now.
Along with came to the fore-front Muslim politics. Under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah, the Muslims of India had put forth a demand for homeland for themselves, and thus, demanded a separate state.
The Muslim League had propounded two nation theory under which it was said that culturally, socially and otherwise the Muslims were quite different from the Hindus and latter could not look after the interests of the former in any way and under any circumstances. It was following calculated policy of opposing the Congress. It clearly said that the Muslims could not expect any justice from Hindu Congress.
As the war began with that the conditions of the Britishers on all war fronts very badly deteriorated. The British empire all over the world was trying to catch every straw and as such need of Indian assistance in men money and materials was ever-increasing.
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With that spirit of nationalism in the country was too rapidly spreading. Indians were now determined to have full freedom for the country- In 1942, Gandhiji started Quit India Movement, which spread in all parts of the country.
Policy of Obstruction:
Every day on war front pressure on the British government was mounting high. There was no day when one or more bad news was not heard from the war front. At this critical time Viceroy in India invited Gandhiji and demanded his support.
A similar request was also made to Muslim League. The League was prepared to help the British government, provided an assurance was given by it about justice to be done to the Muslims in Congress ruled provinces. But Congress party put forth a straight question to the Viceroy as what was the aim of British participation in war.
The government spelled out that preservation of democracy and giving the people the right of self-determination was the aim of this struggle. When Congress party demanded this right for India, British government evaded straight reply and Congress party refused to contribute in war efforts and to co-operate with the government.
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It demanded from the British government an assurance that the right of self determination applied to India as well.
Deadlock in talks and resignation of Congress ministries in the: provinces was hailed by the Muslim League as the Deliverance Day. The League Committee thus resolved, “This meeting, therefore, expresses its deep sense of relief at the termination of Congress regime in various provinces and rejoices in observing this day as the day of Deliverance from tyranny, oppression and injustice.” In this way Muslim League openly opposed the Congress and indirectly extended support to the British government, which was a welcome for the latter.
Muslim League also denounced mass contact movement of the Congress which in its opinion was an attempt to win Muslims to Congress ideology and programme.
After the elections held under the Act of 1935, Congress had established that it was representative body of the Indian masses. This was an eye sore for the Muslim League and since then it followed obstructionist policy.
The League then expounded two nations theory and also gave the slogan of Hindu tyranny. An idea was given to the Muslims by the leadership that the Congress leaders became obsessed with the idea that they could ignore the League altogether and arrogate powers to the Hindu majority.
In a resolution passed in 1937, Muslim League said, “The All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of Ministries in certain provinces by Congress party in flagrant violation of letters and spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Instrument of Instructions and condemns the Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them to safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other important minorities.” Thereafter Muslim League followed policy of creating obstructions for the sake of obstructions alone.
On the other hand, Indian National Congress at its Haripura session in 1938 adopted a resolution by which it said that, “The Congress welcomes the growth of anti-imperialist feelings among the Muslims and other minorities in India and the growing unity of all classes and communities in India in the struggle for India’s independence which is one and indivisible and can only be carried on effectively on a united national basis.”
Muslim League also raised the bogey of Congress fanaticism and characterised it as Hindu organisation. Several offers made to the League to set up impartial enquiry commission to look into the grievances of the Muslims failed and thus no united front could be opened against the British rulers, who could successfully prolong their stay in India by following tactfully policy of divide and rule.
In brief it can be said that League policies aimed at neutralising the forceful blows which nationalist politics was giving to the British supremacy in the country.
The League set up Pir Pur Committee which in its report said that India was not suited for parliamentary form of government and that the government was not paying due regard to the Muslims in public appointments. It also pointed that the Congress was deliberately making far, reaching attacks on civic and cultural rights of the Muslims.
As the time passed every deliberate effort was made by the government to see that the differences between the two major communities in the country widened. On its part Muslim League published a collection of 32 articles in the Dawn of Karachi in which mischievously horrors of crimes and injustices on Muslims by the Congress were highlighted. Top Congress leaders were portrayed as regional dictators.
The Congress was charged as intoxication of power. Muslim League even refused the suggestion of Dr. Rajendra Prasad for a thorough enquiry into alleged atrocities of Congress by Chief Justice of Federal Court. It is said that main cause of this hard attitude of the League was its frustration after 1937 elections.
Proposal for Coalition Government:
When Congress governments in the provinces resigned and war efforts were receiving a serious set back the Viceroy invited Indian leaders to solve the tangle. As an interim measure it was proposed to them that the government intended to expand Viceroy’s Council and also that it proposed to form coalition ministries in the provinces.
This is what the League was really wanting. A week later on November 6,1939 Viceroy declared that his talks with Indian leaders to solve constitutional deadlock in India had failed.
Meanwhile, as already pointed out, Muslim League decided to celebrate, December 22,1939 as Deliverance Day, a day which was symbolised as the day of deliverance from the oppressions and suppressions of the Hindu communal Congress organisation from the provinces in which it was in power and in which the Muslims were made as the victims of Hindu suppression.
A resolution to this effect was also passed by the League meeting. Such a resolution strengthened the hands of the Governor-General and emphasis also shifted from national to communal politics.
Coupland has tried to blame the Congress for such a failure in reaching a decision when he says, “It was unavoidable result of the Congress leaders decision to bring the operation of the existing system to an end.”
Allegations and counter allegations and arguments and counter arguments went on between the peoples (and parties) as to who was to be blamed for the deadlocking of the situation and in a vast country like India this was unavoidable as well.
It was this atmosphere in political life of India which was considered most appropriate by the Muslim League for demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims.
At its 27th Session held at Labour on 22-23 March, 1940, Muslim League resolved, “To yoke together two such nations under a single state one as a numerical majority and other as a minority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a State.”
Mr. Jinnah also wanted that Mahatma Gandhi should accept that Congress was a Hindu organisation and that Muslim League alone represented Muslims of India. On March 23, 1940, Muslim League adopted Pakistan Resolution.
The resolution read as follows:
“Resolved that it is considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan will be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”
This resolution of the Muslim League stirred the whole nation. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar demanded that immediate solution to communal problem in the country should be found out and so was the view of Gandhiji and other leaders of India. But Indian National Congress did not leave any opportunity to see that India fought a united and grim battle against British imperialism and empire in India.
But when Gandhiji found that the Muslim League was coming nowhere near reasonable solution, in desperation he said, “If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation and want to partition India on that basis, they must have the partition.”
August Offer 1940:
With the increase in the cleavage between the Congress and League, need and necessity of India’s co-operation in war efforts was also increasing. Congress leadership made it clear that it was not interested in taking advantage of difficult situation in which Britain had been placed. On 1st June, 1940 Gandhiji said, “We do not seek our independence out of Britain’s ruin.”
More or less similar views were expressed by Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru when he said that, “England’s difficulty is not India’s opportunity.”
It was made clear that Indian National Congress was always willing to help Britain provided the latter agreed to India’s demand for complete independence and immediate establishment of a national government at the Centre, which should contain representatives of main political parties in the country.
It implied that the Congress was prepared to join a coalition government at the Centre. Such a government, it was, however, made clear will be responsible to the popular House. This was however, clearly rejected by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill who declared that, “He had not become His Majesty’s first Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British empire.”
The offer of co-operation thus having been rejected by the British Government, the latter made an offer in August 1940 to Indian leadership on its own.
The offer provided:
(a) British government accepts and offers at the end of hostilities Dominion status to India.
(b) That after the war with least possible delay a Constituent Assembly will be set up in India to frame a constitution for the country.
(c) That the government will hasten decisions on all relevant matters to the utmost degree.
(d) That a certain number of representatives of India were to be invited to join the Governor-General’s Council.
(e) That a war Advisory Council will be established representing Indian states and other national interests in India. Strength of such a Council will be about 20.
It was made clear in the offer that the power will not be transferred to any system of government whose authority was directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.
August offer was rejected both by the Indian National Congress as well as the Muslim League. Congress leadership reacted to the offer by saying that they had demanded independence and in turn they got expanded executive council which was not even dyarchy.
It was felt that the whole scheme was obstructive and made a deliberate mischief to put an “insuperable barrier to India’s freedom.” It was also pointed out that in effect it gave veto power to the Muslim League.
While reacting to the offer, Gandhiji in a letter wrote to Viceroy, “I have very carefully read your pronouncement and slept over it. It has made me sad. Its implications frighten me. I cannot help feeling that a profound mistake has been made.”
When Maulana Azad was invited to discuss the offer with the Viceroy, he declined saying that, “Even without consulting my colleagues, I declined the offer. It appeared to me that there was no common ground between Congress demand for independence and Viceroy’s offer of an enlarged Executive Council.”
Though the offer had tried to accommodate the Muslims by providing for a coalition government at the centre and made it clear that the power will not be transferred to India unless the Muslims agreed to it, yet Muslim League too did not accept it. The offer was rejected by the League on the plea that it provided for the united India and that its main demand for the partition of the country had not been accepted.
It also demanded that the League should be assured in no unambiguous terms that no constitution making process directly or indirectly, will be started unless it had the approval of the Muslim League. In fact, August offer had already given a veto to the League but that was not satisfied with that even.
Individual Civil Disobedience Movement:
When both the Congress and the Muslim League decided to reject August offer constitutional crisis again very much deepened. The result was that both the major political parties as well as the government of India got perplexed.
The Congress party decided that individual members could start civil disobedience movement. In the words of Maulana Azad, Gandhiji initiated the Movement. “He proposed that men and women should protest individually against dragging India into the war. They should disassociate themselves from war efforts publicly and court arrest.”
As many as 25,000 persons were arrested but every effort was made to see that the whole movement was peaceful. But in spite of all sincere efforts by Gandhiji and Congress leaders, the Chief Ministers of Punjab Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan described the movement as stabbing British from the back.
Expansion and After:
Not caring for rejection by both Congress and League of August offer, Governor-General proceeded further with the expansion of his Executive Council. Since no major political party joined the Council only such persons joined it who were Governor-General’s ‘yes men’. Expansion was a guise to show the world British government’s keenness about expansion of Council and associating Indians in their own administration.
The climate was changing to the disadvantage of Britain. World opinion was mounting pressure on British government that constitutional tangle in India should be very quickly solved. Meanwhile Japan also entered war on December 7, 1941 and knocked at the doors of India.
British Prime Minister Churchill accepted in the House of Commons that Britain had no adequate arrangements to checking advancing Japanese forces. President Roosevelt was quite keen that India’s constitutional problem should be satisfactorily solved so that country’s co-operation in war efforts could become available.
In 1942, when Burma surrendered before Japan, invasion over India was quite logical and chances of India’s defeat and subsequent availability of national resources to the enemy could not be ruled out. The demand that provisions of Atlantic Charter should be made applicable to India was getting more and more popularity by nationalists in India.
In 1942, Chiang Ki Sheik also visited India and after critically assessing the situation came to the conclusion that British government should try to find out solution to Indian constitutional problem now without delay.
He made a fervent appeal to the British government in this regard as well. In 1942, President Roosevelt declared in very clear terms that terms of Atlantic Charter applied to all the countries of the world, including India.
This was, of course, not in keeping with the policy of British government towards India, but international pressure on the one hand and the fear of annoyance of the U.S. on the other, so much demoralised Britain that the statement could not be refuted.
Australian Parliament also suggested to the British government that India’s demand of self-government should be immediately conceded so that the country came forward to help Britain in winning the war and the resources were not available to the enemy.
Such was international pressure on Britain that forced the government to give another proposal to India in a bid to solve constitutional dead-lock. It was in this situation that Mr. Churchill declared that, “We must remember also that India is one of the basis from which the strongest counter blows must be struck at the advance of tyranny and aggression.”
Cripps Proposals:
British Conservative party government, therefore, succumbed to international pressures and situations and decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps, a shrewd politician but a close friend of Indian national leaders to India, to start a dialogue afresh and to find out immediate solution to India’s political problem.
He reached Delhi on March 23, 1942 and met leaders of Indian public opinion. He released his proposals at a press conference held on March 29, 1942.
Before, however, these proposals are discussed, it is worthwhile to remember that the scheme took India towards a new direction and introduced a new element in Indian political system. Hitherto British government in India followed polity of divide and rule.
Now the underlying policy was that of divide and quit. Though it was maintained that the partition of India was neither feasible nor a solution to India’s constitutional problem, yet British government always from now onward started thinking that partition was the only solution to the problem and this idea had blessings of all high ups in British hierarchy, policy-makers and politicians as well as administrators.
Cripps proposals can broadly be divided into two categories. Some of the proposals effected India immediately whereas some others were in the form of promises. The proposals provided that soon after the hostilities an elected body will be set up which will be responsible for giving a constitution for India. In this body each community will be given seats in accordance with its population.
The members of lower Houses of the provincial legislatures will constitute electoral college. It will choose representatives by method of proportional representation for the Constituent Assembly. Such electoral college will be required to elect one representative after every ten members. The states shall also be invited to send representatives.
Under the scheme Indian states were also to be given representation in the constitution making body. These states were to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole.
In the constitution making body representatives of the Indian states and British India were to have co-equal powers. A treaty shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s government and the constitution making body, which will cover all necessary matters arising out of complete transfer of power from British government to India.
It was proposed that British government shall accept this constitution without delay. But in the document a provision will be made that those provinces which do not wish to accept the new constitution shall be permitted to be governed under the present Act.
Provision will also be made that if a province which does not wish to be immediately governed under the new scheme, but subsequently wants to shed the present system of government and wishes to be governed under the new system, shall be permitted to do so.
It will also be provided that government shall ensure that rights and interests of racial and religious minorities will be fully well protected and undertakings given to them by His Majesty’s government will also be fully well honoured.
India will be given Dominion status and shall have the power to break away from the British Commonwealth, if it so liked. Whether an Indian state decides or not to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangement to the extent to which new constitution will require it.
As regards that part of the proposal which was to be implemented immediately practically nothing was given. It was said that it was the responsibility of the British government to defend India and that Indians should give money and material assistance to make the war a success.
It was also said that His Majesty’s government desired to have immediate and effective participation of the principal sections of the Indian people in the Councils of the country and in the Commonwealth of Nations.
Thus, they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help to discharge a task which was vital and essential for the future freedom of India. It was said that elections to provincial Assemblies will be held after the cessations of hostilities and the Assembly shall be a single electoral college for electing representatives to constitution making body on the basis of proportional representation.
Rejection of the Proposals by Congress:
Cripps proposals were accepted by no section of Indian society. Indian National Congress considered the proposals at great length. It was felt that the proposals wrecked all hopes of national unity because these provided for either acceptance or non-acceptance of the new scheme by the provinces. The scheme did not provide for common and co-operative national life.
The resolution of the Congress Committee said that, “This proposal has been presumably made to meet a communal demand but it will have other consequences also and lead to politically reactionary and obstructionist groups among different groups among different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country.”
In the words of Pi. Nehru, “To think of partitioning India at this stage went against the whole current of modem historical and economic development. It seemed to be fantastic in the extreme.”
The Congress party also rejected the proposals because these were anti-democratic in nature. It had been provided in the scheme that the representatives of the states will not be elected but nominated. Such people will obviously be reactionaries and the British government will use them to serve their purpose.
With their help it will get any proposal sabotaged. In this way the little democratic element which had been introduced was sure to become meaningless. Moreover, it was felt that acceptance of such a scheme meant betraying the growth of freedom struggle in the states.
In the words of Pt. Nehru, “Our acceptance of this principle would have been a negation of our well established and of repeated policy and betrayal of the states who would have been condemned to autocratic rule for a much longer period.”
Congress party showed its concern by saying that, “The complete ignoring of ninety million of people of Indian states and their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their rulers is a negation of both democracy and self-determination.”
Still another drawback of the scheme was that it gave promises only and nothing beyond that. There was nothing which was to be given to the people of India immediately. During the course of war the Governor-General was to act in the same autocratic manner.
No elected element was introduced. Moreover, the executive council was not made responsible to the Assembly. It was just living on promises and hopes, which was not acceptable to Indian National Congress.
There were also differences about the defence of India. The Congress had made it clear that during the war period defence portfolio should be transferred to an Indian member. Cripps was, however, evasive on this as well.
In the words of Pt. Nehru, “So far as the present was concerned, the British war cabinet proposals were vague and incomplete except that they made it clear that the Defence of India must remain the sole responsibility of the British government.”
Muslim League’s Rejection of Proposals:
Not only this that the Congress party rejected it but the proposal was also rejected by Muslim League in spite of the fact the demand of a homeland for the Muslims for all practical purposes had been accepted.
In a resolution Muslim League said, “The alleged power of the minority in the matter of secession suggested in the document is illusory, as Hindu India will dominate the decision in favour of the All India Union in all the provinces and the Muslims in Bengal and Punjab will be at the mercy of Hindu majority in those provinces, who will exert themselves to the fullest extent and length for keeping the Musalmans tied to the chariot wheel of Hindustan.”
Rejection of Proposals by Others:
Hindu Mahasabha rejected it saying that the proposals aimed at Balkanisation of India. In fact, the Sikhs and scheduled castes and backward classes completely rejected these proposals.
Even liberals like M.R. Jayakar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru condemned these proposals by saying, “The creation of more than one union, however, consistent in theory with the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests of the country, its integrity and security.”
Depressed classes in a resolution said that, “We are all absolutely convinced that the proposals are calculated to do greater harm to depressed classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of the Hindu rule.” The Sikhs declared that they would oppose by all possible means the separation of Punjab from Indian Union.
Evaluation of Cripps Proposals:
Cripps Mission failed in India and in fact, there was nothing unexpected in that. The proposals, as these were formulated and time at which these were announced and the way in which whole situation was handled, made many believe that whole scheme was a propagandist eye wash and nothing beyond that.
Moreover, even Government of India and the British Parliament were sure that Indian nationalists, who were considerably awakened, shall not be satisfied by mere promises or jugglary of words. In the words of Dr. Sitaramayya, “Cripps proposals embodied different items palatable to different tasks…. There was no intention to part with power in them.”
Gandhi described these proposals as a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank. To Cripps he frankly told, why did you come to India if this is what you have to offer. If this is your entire proposal to India, I will advise you to take the next plane home.
Jawahar Lal Nehru said that, “The more one thought of these proposals, the more fantastic they grew; Even Harold J. Laski opined about these proposals, “It was psychologically disastrous for Sir Stafford to go to India in ‘take it or leave it’ mood and on his return practically announce that we washed our hands of the offer.”
The whole scheme ended in bad taste. The people of India got an impression that British government was not sincere in purpose and that it simply played with our sentiments and feelings. It was also felt that the British government was also befooling Indian masses on one pretext or the other and thus interested to make them live on promises and nothing beyond that.
It also ended in bad taste because it widened the gap between the Hindus and the Muslims in India to the extent that they would never come closer and nearer to each other in future on the national political scene. In the view of Lal Bahadur, “It was a dangerous proposal and unequivocal acceptance of demand for Pakistan and all the pleadings of Cripps to the contrary was a mere eyewash to Indian nationalism.”
Cripps Mission and After:
Cripps Mission was a failure. It ended in bad taste and the gulf between the Congress and the League on the one hand and between the Congress and the British rulers, on the other very much increased. Gandhiji demanded that the British should leave India and they themselves will take care of their own affairs without involving the Britishers.
In a frustrated mood on June 9, 1942, Gandhiji declared that, “There is no half way house between withdrawal and non-withdrawal.” On July 14, 1942, Indian National Congress also passed a resolution demanding immediate withdrawal of Britain from Indian soil.
Mr. Jinnah, however, reacted to this resolution of the Congress by saying that, “Such a demand was merely to establish Hindu Congress Raj on minorities and the Muslims and nothing else.” A.I.C.C. on August 8, 1942, however, made it clear that after withdrawal the power will pass on to Indians and not to the Congress party.
It was also suggested that a provisional government should be set up with the responsibility of evolving a scheme for the setting up of the Constituent Assembly. Basically the constitution will be federal in nature and maximum autonomy will be given to the provinces.
Quit India Movement:
Gandhiji declared that Congress was going to launch a mass movement to make the Britishers Quit India. This resolution popularly came to be known as ‘Quit India’ resolution. The mass movement for quitting India, however, did not start all of a sudden.
Mira Ben was deputed to meet Viceroy and convey the sense behind this resolution. She was refused interview and clearly told that such a resolution sensed rebellion and the government will not tolerate this when war was going on.
As a first measure Gandhiji and other top Congress leaders were arrested, Congress was declared as an illegal organisation and offices and property of the organisation was seized. This in turn had its own reaction. The people rose in revolt against the government. There were demonstrations throughout the country.
There were also conflicts between the people and police and even army. People in thousands were killed and many more arrested. There was complete dislocation of communication system. Men and women were mercilessly” tortured.
In the words of Michael Breerch, “To short everywhere government repression was very harsh and police state was established to deal with the danger which constituted the greatest threat to British rule since the rebellion of 1857.”
More or less similar views were expressed about repressions by Pi. Nehru when he said that, “All conventions and subterfuges that usually veil the activities of government were torn aside and only naked force remained as the symbol of authority.”
Meanwhile British government tried to establish that Congress movement which believed in non-violence had become revolutionary in character and was in League with Japanese aggressors. Gandhiji, therefore, demanded that the charge that Congress organisation was in league with Japanese aggressors should be investigated.
When this demand was not accepted he went on fast on February 10, 1944. His health day-by-day deteriorated. Meanwhile British government also thought it advisable to release him from jail so that he could control the movement and run it on non-violent lines.
Accordingly Gandhiji was released on May 6, 1944. But by now his health had so much deteriorated that he could not undertake any major activity or launches any new programme.
After improving his health Gandhiji decided to make another attempt to find a solution of India’s political problem with Muslim League. Maulana Azad., however, feels that this attempt was a blunder. In his words, “Gandhiji’s approach to Mr. Jinnah on the occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the full.”
Rajaji Formula:
In order to solve constitutional deadlock, C. Rajagopalachari, gave his own formula which was at the cost of political unity of the country.
Some of the important provisions of the formula were:
(a) Muslim League should accept India’s demand for independence.
(b) It should co-operate with the Congress, in the formation of an interim government.
(c) As soon as the hostilities are over a Commission will be set up to demarcate Muslim majority contiguous districts in the North, West and East of India. Thereafter plebiscite will be held on die basis of adult franchise in these areas to decide the issue of separation from Hindustan.
(d) Before plebiscite every political party will be given the fullest opportunity to express its view point before the people.
(e) In case some of the provinces wanted separation an agreement will be signed with them about defence, commerce and communication, etc.
(f) There will be no use of force in transfer of population if at all that became unavoidable and that will be on voluntary basis.
(g) These terms will be binding only, if Britain transferred power to India in to-to.
(f) Surprisingly the formula had the blessings of Gandhiji, who requested Jinnah to open negotiations with the authors of the formula.
Mr. Jinnah, however, did not agree to the formula and put forth such terms and conditions which were absolutely unacceptable to the Congress. He wanted Congress party to accept two nation theory and partition without plebiscite.
He was not in favour of allowing the non-Muslim majority areas to take part in deciding the issue of a separate state for the Muslims. But effects of the formula were no less significant. Prestige of Mr. Jinnah went very high.
The Hindus of Punjab and Bengal got demoralised to the idea of their being a part an Islamic state. No less nervousness was among the Sikhs.
In the words of Menon, “The offer was calculated only to strengthen Jinnah’s hands and further the cause of Muslim League.” Hindu Mahasabha leader V.D. Savarkar said that the Indian provinces were no private property of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to any one they liked.
While discussing the implications of the formula B.R. Nanda commented, “The Rajaji formula had formed the initial basis of the negotiations, though it did not concede all that Jinnah demanded, but at least it recognised the possibility of partition of the country.”
The Wavell Plan:
Lord Wavell came to India as Viceroy and Governor-General of the country. He had long association with India and had also worked with Cripps when he came to India. He gave his plan on July 19, 1945. There were several causes responsible for giving his plan to India. By 1945, it had become amply clear that Indians were by now sufficiently awakened and also that mere jugglary of words will not satisfy them.
It was, therefore, very essential that they should be given something real and concrete power and authority. Moreover, by 1945 war situation had considerably changed to the advantage of the Allies and Nazis were being defeated on every front. There was every hope that war in Europe will soon come to an end.
It was, however, expected that Japan would not surrender along with Hitler and might continue war for some time more. The best base from where Japan could be counter attacked was India and for this India’s co-operation was unavoidable.
In the country discontentment also got aggravated on account of the famines in which about 1.15 million persons perished and about 4.5 million people suffered. By now Congress had so much wooed Jinnah that he began to be considered as equal to Gandhiji.
The latter even held confidential meetings at the residence of the former and exchanged letters with him in which Gandhiji is stated to have showed his willingness to recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of claim for partition contained in League’s Lahore’s resolution of 1940, subject to certain conditions.
When war came to an end in Europe, Churchill was not considered to be a suitable Prime Minister for post war reconstruction work. He was, therefore, replaced by a non-Conservative government.
He, however, wanted to prove to the world that real problem which stood on the way of solving constitutional dead-lock in India was not lack of sincerity on the part of British government but mutual differences of two major religious communities, namely, the Hindus and the Muslims. It was under these circumstances that Wavell plan was given to India.
Some of the important provisions of the plan were:
(a) Executive Council of the Viceroy will be reconstituted and expanded in which all its members except the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief will be Indians.
(b) In the Executive Council the Muslims and caste Hindus will have equal representation and all other communities will be given balanced representation.
(c) The Governor-General will sparingly use his veto power.
(d) A British High Commissioner will be appointed to look after Indian commercial interests in other dominions.
(e) Indians will frame their own constitution notwithstanding anything contained in this scheme.
(f) Secretary of State will interfere in Indian affairs only in the interest of India.
(g) Section 93 of the Act of 1935 will be scrapped from the provinces, if India accepted this scheme.
Before disclosing his plan, Lord Wavell decided to release all political prisoners. The plan is to be viewed in the background of failure of Bholabhai Desai and Liaqat Ali Khan negotiations commonly known as Desai-Liaqat Pact in which former had made a proposal that two parties would join on parity basis in the proposed interim government and some other religious communities will also be given representation in it.
Shimla Conference:
Lord Wavell invited Indian leaders to Shimla to discuss the scheme. The discussions opened on June 29, 1945, and lasted till July 14 of the same year, but ultimately these failed. In spite of the fact that 80% of the Hindu population was placed on parity with 10% of the Muslim population.
Mr. Jinnah turned down proposals on the plea that Muslim League should have the exclusive right to send Muslim representatives on the executive council of the then Viceroy. He was not prepared to accept the view point that Congress should nominate any Muslim even from its own quota.
Though this idea was not at all favoured by British government but Lord Wavell accepted that because he did not wish to annoy Muslim League.
He instead of setting the matter right declared that, “This was a matter which should be decided between the Congress and the Muslim League and it would not be proper for either the government or for himself as an individual to enforce a decision on any party.”
About the failure of the talks Pattabhai Sitaramayya wrote, “The years back in April 1942, it was the Congress that broke the Cripps Mission, if it was not Cripps himself who broke his own. In Shimla it was the League that broke the Wavell plan although Lord Wavell took blame upon himself.”
About the effects of the Wavell plan it can be said that it exposed to the people of India strategy of Mr. Jinnah in no hidden terms. It was now clear that communal politics and not national interest was the main objective of the League.
Similarly it also made it amply clear that British government in India was not quite keen to give self-government to the people of India but it was only killing time and postponing the problem on one pretext or the other.
Maulana Azad writes, “The Shimla Conference marks a break down in Indian political history. This was for the first time that negotiations failed not on the basic political issues between India and Britain but on the communal issue dividing different Indian groups.”
Similarly K.P. Menon also wrote, “The Shimla Conference afforded last opportunity to the forces of nationalism to fight a rear guard action to preserve the integrity of the country, and when the battle was lost the waves of communalism quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobsons choice of partition was left.”
About the Plan Banerjee said, “The Cripps Plan had been rejected by the Congress as also by the Leagues. The Wavell plan was rejected by the League alone.
The prestige and position of Mr. Jinnah very much increased and to the Muslims it was clear that he alone could deliver the goods and that middle of the road Muslim politicians tended to weaken the Muslim League.
Less than a year later Jinnah found himself in a much stronger position and the partition of India was in sight.” Infact, failure of Shimla Conference was the victory of Muslim League. It clearly showed that the League had veto power in Indian politics.
Towards Cabinet Mission in India:
Cabinet Mission came to India at a very critical time of Indian history. The failure of Wavell plan had created an atmosphere of frustration, particularly among the majority community whose interests were sacrificed in the plan.
Minority community was sitting as a veto on the will of the majority. It was amply clear that the British government was in league with the Muslim League and not at all interested in solving India’s constitutional problem.
This indifference of the government towards India had still more increased because Britain had won war in Europe. By this time the position of Mr. Jinnah had considerably increased in Indian politics and Muslim League was quite hopeful of separate home land for the Muslims of India.
INA Affairs:
When Britain was adopting this indifferent attitude at that time came the trial of INA. Subhash Chandra Bose had suddenly left India because he felt that Gandhian way of solving constitutional problem would take a very long time and that India could not wait for that long.
He, therefore, left India in disguise via Afganistan and reached Germany. After this he went to Japan and decided to organise Indian National Army. It mostly consisted of those Indians who had been fighting on British side but had been arrested by the Nazis.
They were patriots and under the supreme command of Subhash Chandra Bose organised a separate independent government on Japanese soil. INA so well organised itself that soon it invaded India and reached Burma border and Manipur.
When INA was knocking Indian doors fortunately war in Europe turned in favour of Britain and Allied forces. After the fall of Hitler, position of Japan became very weak. She ultimately surrendered when the USA dropped two atom bombs on Japanese soil.
When Japan surrendered, with that British forces were in a position to capture some INA soldiers. In India they were given by the people, thumping welcome. But for Britain they were war criminals.
The government decided to try them as rebellious soldiers. This created great resentment among the people of India and thus, strained relations between the government and the people. One serious effect of the whole episode was that to the British government it became very clear that Indian soldiers were not with British government. This was really very alarming situation for the rulers.
On the heels of INA came naval mutiny which took place in 1945-46. Royal Air Force also revolted at Dum Dum and other air force stations. There was also hunger strike in the air force. On February 18, 1946, there was mutiny at Bombay at RIN air base which lasted for five days.
Even officers resorted to direct action. There were also disturbances in the army and air force and by now it was amply clear that armed forces were not loyal to the British government. Maulana Azad wrote that, “All these developments convinced the British that they could no longer rely on the armed forces unless the political problem of India was satisfactorily solved.”
British government on its part convened a conference of Provincial Governors on 1st August, 1945, where problem of ending Governor rule in the provinces was considered and it was decided to hold elections in the provinces. Elections were announced for Central and Provincial legislatures.
But meanwhile situation in England changed and Conservative party which had taken a rigid stand about India’s independence was defeated at the polls and Labour party came to power.
On 19th September, 1945, on behalf of British government Lord Wavell declared that, “His Majesty’s Government are determined to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian public opinion the early realisation of self-government in India.” He also assured the people of India that His Majesty’s government was quite keen for setting up a Constituent Assembly for India.
Since the elections had been announced Congress, after prolonged discussions, decided to participate in these. In Congress election manifesto it was made clear that it stood for equal rights for all citizens; fundamental rights and civil liberties for every Indian citizen, eradication of poverty and raising of living standard of the masses. It also stood for world federation of free nations. Congress wanted national freedom from which all other freedoms would automatically flow.
As a result of these elections Congress came to power in all Hindu majority provinces and also in NWFP. In Bengal and Sindh Muslim League was in a position to form government. In Punjab a coalition government in which Congress was a partner, came into being.
Cabinet Mission in India:
After the elections were over Lord Attlee issued a statement on March 15, 1946, in which India’s right of self-determination and framing her own constitution was clearly admitted. He also made it amply clear that it would be for India to decide, whether she wanted remain a member of the Commonwealth or not. It was also stated that minority will not be allowed to veto the advance of majority.
It was also stated that a Commission consisting of Cabinet Ministers will soon be sent to India to discuss Indian problem. Accordingly a Commission consisting of Lord Pathick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander arrived in India on March 23, 1946. During his stay in India the Commission interviewed 472 Indian leaders and held many formal and informal meetings.
It tried to have an agreed formula for India’s independence, but failed. During the course of his discussions Gandhiji made it clear that, “Pakistan which connotes the division of India will be a sin and the two nation theory propounded by Mr. Jinnah is absurd.”
On the other hand, Muslim League insisted that India should be partitioned. Its clear stand being that, “So far as Muslim India is concerned, the conception of a united India is impossible. If any attempt is made to force a decision against the wishes of the Muslims, Muslim India will resist it by all means and at all costs.”
The Muslim leaders said that Muslims were not a dead nation and that in fighting against the Hindu Raj they will create such a havoc which will put to shame what even Changiz Khan did in the past.
Cabinet Mission gradually got convinced that the Hindus and the Muslims were nowhere coming nearer to each other. It was clear because at its Convention held on April 7, 1946, in New Delhi, Muslim League demanded Pakistan or resort to Direct Action.
It was also said that resistance to Pakistan will not be by mere words. Even then it made it amply clear that the sovereign state of Pakistan was not feasible because creation of such a state was not likely to solve the problem of Muslim minorities left in remaining India. Such a state was not feasible even on economic, administrative and military point of view. This will also create problems for Indian states as well.
When it became clear that united India was only solution to India’s political problems Congress gave its own scheme. In this it was provided that India should be a united state in which provinces should be given maximum autonomy. These will be required to surrender only three subjects; namely, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications.
There will be single Constituent Assembly for which members will be elected on the basis of single transferable vote system from the provinces. In the Assembly the representatives of the States will also be added. The Constitution was to be revised after every 10 years. Since this scheme was also not acceptable to the Muslim League, on May 16, Cabinet Mission released its own scheme.
Cabinet Mission Proposals:
Cabinet Mission scheme had the following characteristics:
(i) There will be union of India, which will include Indian states.
(ii) The proposed Union will deal with subjects like Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communication and raise funds for running these subjects.
(iii) The Union will have an executive and a legislature which will be constituted from the British India and Indian states.
(iv) Every major communal issue will be decided by a majority vote of the representatives of both the major communities present and voting.
(v) All subjects except those mentioned above, as well as residuary subjects will be vested in the provinces.
(vi) The states will themselves decide the subjects which they will like to surrender to the Union.
(vii) The provinces will be free to form their own groups and each such group shall have a separate executive and legislature. Each group will be independent and decide the subjects to be taken in common.
(viii) There will be a provision for the revision of constitution after every ten years.
(ix) Cabinet Mission also made a provision for a Constituent Assembly for India. It was provided that in the proposed Constituent Assembly- each province will be given representation on the basis of its population.
(x) Each province will send representatives on the basis of population of each community in that province.
(xi) There will be three classes of electorates, namely, General, the Muslims and the Sikhs.
Accordingly the total strength of the Constituent Assembly was fixed at 292 from Indian provinces, 4 from Chief Commissioner Provinces and to a maximum of 93 from the Indian States. Seats to each province will be allotted taking into account its population, which will be roughly one to a million. Seats will also be allotted taking population of every community of the province.
The distribution of seats in the provinces was as shown in the Table given below:
The strength of Constituted Assembly was thus as under:
Group ‘A’ Provinces – 187
Group ‘B’ Provinces – 35
Group ‘C’ Provinces – 70
Chief Commissioner Provinces – 4
Indian states – 93
(xii) It was hoped that India will continue to remain a member of the Commonwealth; but decision will be entirely her own.
(xiii) A treaty will be signed between the Constituent Assembly and the British government giving effect to the transfer of power.
(xiv) Since the Constituent Assembly was to take some time to complete its task, it was provided that there will be an interim government at the Centre and till then such a government shall have 14 members out of which 6 will be of the Congress, 5 of the Muslim League and one each of the Indian Christians, the Sikhs and the Parsees. All the portfolios will be transferred to Indian leaders.
(xv) After the transfer of power paramount over Indian States will end and it was hoped that each state will negotiate with the new power and union government.
The scheme also provided that the representatives of the Indian provinces for the Constituent Assembly will be represented on the basis of proportional representation from the provincial Assemblies by transferable vote system. It will be ensured that each community gets proper representation.
The representatives of the States were to be represented by a Negotiating Committee. At its very first session the Assembly was to set up an Advisory Committees on the Rights of Citizens Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas.
Provincial representatives were to be divided into groups as mentioned above and each group was to frame its own constitution for its own group and also was to decide what provincial subjects a group was to deal. A province could also be allowed to come out of a particular group assigned to it if it so liked after the task of enacting constitution had been completed.
Critical Evaluation of the Plan:
Cabinet Mission Plan was, of course, not accepted by India but the scheme had its very good point as well. In the words of Gandhiji, “It is the best document the British Government could have produced in the circumstances.”
In the words of Maulana Azad, “The acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan by both Congress and Muslim League was a glorious event in the history of freedom movement in India.”
But subsequently the same Maulana Azad said, “We rejoiced but we did not then know that our joy was premature and bitter disappointment awaited us.” The whole plan by all means was a sincere effort on the part of British government to solve India’s constitutional deadlock.
The merit of the scheme also lies in the fact that it was made amply clear that partition of India was not a feasible solution to the problem of Indian minorities. Both Lord Pathick Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps repeatedly said that they could not see how a scheme of Pakistan as envisaged by Muslim League could be viable or stable.
Grouping formula which the scheme proposed was to satisfy the Muslims of India because Groups B and C contained predominantly Muslim majority provinces. In this way to a large extent Muslim demand was also met.
It was also a democratic scheme because for the composition of Constituent Assembly the principle of proportional representation was accepted. In this way the old idea of giving weightage to the minorities was abandoned.
Then the merit of the scheme was that in the Assembly all the representatives were to be Indians. Similarly in the interim government all the portfolios were to be dealt with by Indians. The Constituent Assembly was made a sovereign body and Indian states were to be given representation only according to their population.
The scheme was also important because in the states the princes were not to nominate representatives for the Constituent Assembly. This responsibility was to be given to the people of the states. This was a major change insofar as the states were concerned.
The scheme undoubtedly had very salient characteristics and under the circumstances under which it was given, perhaps it provided the best possible solution. But at the same time it had its drawbacks as well, which equally cannot be under-estimated. Under the scheme very few subjects were given to the Centre, even residuary powers were also given to the provinces.
In this way a weak Centre was created. For a vast country like India only a strong Centre could effectively work and deliver the goods. Creating a weak Centre was perhaps the greatest drawback of the scheme, particularly because in the country disintegrating forces were at work and working of the constitution was to be periodically reviewed.
This was bound to create a situation of uncertainty. Then the scheme gave a great blow and set back to India’s national unity. The provinces were divided into groups on the basis of religion and each group was given full autonomy to frame its own constitution. Not only that, but even each province was also given liberty to leave the group.
Then under the scheme the constitution, which the Assembly was to give, was not going to be a permanent document. It was to be changed after every 10 years. This was bound to create a situation of uncertainty. A constitution in a federal system is always a permanent document and expected to be a source of confidence both for the Centre as well as the federating States.
Then another drawback of the plan was that its language on very important issues was vague. It was not clear whether it was compulsory for the provinces to join federation or not. In fact, language of several articles of the proposed plan e.g., 15(5), 19(8) and 19(5) was self-contradictory and subsequently could result in great controversy between two major political parties, namely, the Congress and the Muslim League.
Then another difficulty of the scheme was that the Constituent Assembly as created by the scheme, was undemocratic. Its members were to be elected on the basis of the strength of each community in the provinces. It was also undemocratic because the states were not as democratic as the provinces.
Then the seeds of mischief were sown in the plan itself when it was said about the states that after paramountcy came to an end, these will have the fullest liberty to either join Indian Union or not. Thus, all that was designed was a disunited rather than a united India.
The Sikhs had a grievance against the plan. According to them their interests were not protected and they were absolutely thrown at the mercy of the Muslims, which they did not like.
The whole plan was very rigid. It was provided that it should be accepted or rejected in to-to. Thus there was no scope for modification of the scheme before its acceptance. Rigidity of scheme undoubtedly was unwanted and uncalled for.
The plan had provided for an interim government. It was, however, not clear for how long will this interim government remain in office. Not only this, but great injustice was done to the Hindus in the scheme of things. In the government the Hindus were given only 6 seats, as against the Muslims who were given 5 seats.
Since the Congress was not given the right to send any Muslim representatives, even out of its own quota, the result was that national character of the Congress, which it was maintaining all along, was thrown into the dust. This was the basic reason why Congress decided not to join the interim government.
The Hindu Mahasabha objected to the scheme on the plea that it placed the Hindus of certain provinces like Punjab, Assam, Bengal, Sindh and NWFP at the mercy of the Muslims, without taking adequate measures for protecting their rights and interests.
In fact, the whole scheme was a step forward towards creation of a separate state of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah after studying the scheme said to his followers that it was first step towards Pakistan.
Towards Mountbatten Plan:
Under the Cabinet Mission plan both the Congress and the Muslim League were given representation at par and national character of the Congress had been challenged. The result of this mischief was that the Congress declined the offer of the Viceroy to join the interim government.
Accordingly on June 16, 1946, Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission issued a statement in which it was stated that he was inviting the leaders of major political parties to join interim government. But the Congress decided to keep out of it.
Muslim League, however, agreed to join that. Viceroy, however, felt that a Government which did not include Congress representatives could not be a success and he decided to postpone the formation of an interim government till Congress agreed to join it.
On June 26, 1946, Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah that, “Since the Congress and the Muslim League had now accepted the statement of 16th May, it was the intention of the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy to form a coalition government including both these parties as soon as possible. In view, however, of the long negotiations which has already taken place and since we all had other work to do, we felt that it would be better to have a short interval before proceeding with further negotiations for the formation of an interim government.”
Meanwhile efforts will be made for the setting up of the Constituted Assembly. Cabinet Mission thereafter left for England on June 29, 1946.
This letter so much annoyed Mr. Jinnah that he demanded that since interim government was not coming into being, therefore,-elections to the Constituent Assembly should also not take place. When Viceroy did not agree to this proposal, the Muslim League also decided not to join the interim government.
In spite of the fact that the League did not like to go to the polls for electing representatives for the Constituent Assembly, Viceroy decided that the elections should be held so that the process of transfer of responsibility to Indians started.
The elections were accordingly held in July, 1946. Congress was returned with thumping majority. This very much annoyed the Muslim League which again came out with the usual argument that the Hindu dominated Constituent Assembly was bound to have its own way, sacrificing the interests of the Muslims and other minorities.
The League, therefore, decided not to join the Assembly and instead decided to resort to Direct Action on August 16, 1946, to get Pakistan as homeland of the Muslims.
Direct Action Day:
In order to press its demand for a homeland the Muslim League decided to bid farewell to Constitutional means and to observe 16th August as Direct Action Day. It was on this day that there was bloodshed in Calcutta and Noakhali.
Thousands were killed whereas thousand others were injured. Property worth crores of rupees was destroyed and in the name of religion atrocities were committed on innocent women and children. There were bloody communal massacres.
On July 22,1946, negotiations again started for the formation of interim government. Under the revised scheme it was proposed that the Congress will nominate six representatives, including one scheduled castes, Muslim League five and three representatives of minority communities will be nominated by the government and one of them will be a Sikh.
The names submitted by one party will not be objected by the other. Distribution of portfolios will be decided by the parties themselves but both the major political parties will share the major portfolios. The interim government will be treated as Dominion Government for all practical purposes.
Mr. Jinnah objected to the revised scheme as well on the plea that the Congress should not be given the right of nominating any Muslim and also that distribution of important portfolios on equal basis between the two major communities was an impossibility. Muslim League also objected to the idea of nominating on its own the representatives of the minority communities, without consulting the League.
Congress Joins Interim Government:
The Congress, however, accepted proposals of the Viceroy and accordingly Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru was invited to form the government. All subsequent efforts to bring Muslim League in the interim government miserably failed.
On September 2, 1946, interim government was installed in power. Finding Congress and other parties in power, Jinnah also agreed on October 13, 1946, to join the government “to get a foot hold to fight for the cherished goal of Pakistan” and create as many obstructions as possibly could be created.
Since the League was not at all interested in co-operating with the Congress, therefore, the question of Joint and collective responsibility did not arise. Muslim League of those days tried its best to ensure that wheels of cabinet coach come as quickly to a standstill as possible. Communal riots and incidences of communal hatred in the country fouled the whole climate.
Meanwhile Viceroy decided to convene meeting of the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1946. Jinnah was afraid of Congress returning with thumping majority in the Constituent Assembly and decided to boycott the Assembly. He also charged the Viceroy of being blind to the situation and in league with the Congress.
In order to save the situation from further deterioration Lord Attlee, fie British Prime Minister, made last attempt to bring a compromise between the Congress and the Muslim League. He, however, miserably failed and attitude of the Muslim League remained as hard as it was in the past.
British Government was, however, very keen that the power should be transferred to the Indians as early as possible. He, therefore, made a statement in the House of Commons that Britain will leave India by June, 1948.
He also said that even if Indian leadership does not come to any compromise by this date, British government will decide then to whom the power of British India may be transferred, i.e., whether to one central authority or to provinces in some of the cases. Since there was a hint that in some cases power might be transferred to provinces, Muslim League too tried to topple governments in NWFP, Assam and Punjab.
Whereas it failed in the case of two first mentioned provinces, in Punjab Sir Sikandar at Khan, the Chief Minister, resigned and Governor took over the administration of the province. The Congress party, however, appreciated the decision of the British government to leave India by a particular date and mentioning nothing about the partition of the country. Gandhiji even said, “So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the partition of India nor will I, if I can help it allow Congress to accept it.” But subsequently several other leaders persuaded him and on account of desire to see free India, he was made to agree to the partition of India. In this way Muslim League which followed pressure tactics and policy of communal disharmony seemed near reaching its goal.
When Lord Mountbatten came to India Muslim League was already in a very aggressive mood. It was sure of the support of British government to their cause of Pakistan. At its Delhi meeting it gave a call of direct action saying that it was ‘not to get his coreligionists out of the slavery under the British rule, it was against the contemplated future of caste, Hindu domination’.
On 16th August, 1946, it celebrated ‘Direct Action Day’ with the object of either dividing or destroying India. Even when the League joined the interim government towards the end of October it intended to follow obstructionist policies and created such an atmosphere that the Congress members twice threatened to resign.
Sardar Patel even felt that it was League-Wavell plan to throw Congress out of interim government. On its part Congress also felt that since the entry of Muslim League one by one the Viceroy has been removing the wheels of the cabinet coach and bringing it to a standstill.
The League was admitted into interim government without getting a declaration from it about acceptance of Cabinet Mission proposals. It was at this stage that Prime Minister Attlee declared that His Majesty’s government would not force a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country.
This reduced the effectiveness of the work of the Constituent Assembly to a large extent and when it met-on December 9, 1946, for the first time 74 League members kept away from it.
The League accelerated its programme of direct action which was so horrifying that even the British Prime Minister felt that present state of uncertainty could not be postponed indefinitely and he declared his government’s decision to leave India by June, 1948.
Because of this declaration the League now tried to create a situation of coercion and intimidation in which certain decisions could be made in its favour. It launched civil disobedience movement in provinces where Muslim physical force was not adequate and started horrible communal riots so that the Congress accepted its demand of creation of Pakistan.
It was in this tense situation that on March 24, 1947, Lord Mountbatten assumed office of the Viceroy of India.
Mountbatten Plan (June 3, 1947):
Lord Mountbatten came to India on March, 1946, with clear instructions to transfer power to Indians as quickly as possible it could be. He was convinced that partition was no solution to India’s constitutional problem. He met Indian leaders and after ascertaining their views he went to England in May 1947.
He came back to India and on June 3, 1947 and unfolded his plan of solving problem which was so far evading solution. It was in this plan that proposal was made for the partition of India. Dr. Ishwari Prasad is of the view that role of convincing Congress leadership to accept partition proposal was that of Lady Mountbatten.
In his own words, “By remarkable adaptability of character and pleasing manners, she won the hearts of all the great adversaries of the land.” Gandhiji even at this late stage wrote in Harijan that the demand for partition of India was both un-islamic and sinful, because Islam did not preach hatred and partition.
He still said that, “They may cut me to pieces but they cannot make me subscribe to something which I consider to be wrong.” Dorothy Norman is of the view that partition proposal of Lord Mountbatten matured because during this critical period Gandhiji was kept in pariphery and real negotiation work was done by Nehru and Patel.
Salient Features of the Scheme:
(1) There will be two Legislative Assemblies, one of the Hindu and the other of the Muslim dominated areas and each Assembly will decide whether it wishes to be partitioned or not. If either part favoured partition, that will be accepted.
(2) If either of the province opts for partition it will also have to decide whether it will like to join the already established Constituent Assembly or a new Constituent Assembly which will consist of representatives of those areas which decide not to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly.
(3) The Province of Sindh will decide whether as a whole it will like to join existing or new Constituent Assembly.
(4) Area of Sylhet will decide by referendum whether it will continue to remain part of Assam or join East Bengal, which will form part of Pakistan.
(5) A referendum will be held in NWFP to decide whether the province will like to join India or Pakistan.
(6) British Baluchistan will also be given a right to decide whether this Chief Commissioner province will like to stay in India or join newly born State of Pakistan.
(7) In case majority areas of Bengal, Assam and Punjab decide for partition of the provinces then a boundary Commission will be set up to demarcate the boundary.
(8) Both India and Pakistan will be given dominion status.
(9) Boundaries of both India and Pakistan will be decided by a Boundary Commission to be appointed by the Governor-General.
(10) Paramountcy over the states will lapse and the states will be free to decide about the dominion to which they propose to join or to remain independent.
In accordance with the Plan separate assemblies where necessary were convened. Punjab and Bengal opted for partition, whereas Sylhet decided to join East Bengal. Referendum was held in NWFP which decided to join Pakistan.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
All India Congress Committee, Sikh Conference and Muslim League all accepted the Plan. Since Bengal and Punjab opted for partition a boundary Commission under Sir Cyril Redcliff was set up to demarcate the boundaries.
Why was Partition Accepted?
Congress leadership was all along against partition of India and Gandhiji had gone to the extent of saying that India will be partitioned on my dead body but still the partition was accepted. For this one great reason, as already pointed out was, that during those critical days of negotiations leadership went in the hands of Pt. Nehni and Sardar Patel.
Then according to the author of “Freedom at Midnight” Congress leadership did not know that Mr. Jinnah was victim of tuberculosis and his end was drawing near. Had they or even Lord Mountbatten come to know of this vital secret, perhaps this tragedy would not have occurred.
Then it was also felt by Congress leadership that due to unbending attitude of Muslim League, united India will either be delayed or won at the cost of civil war and for both the situations Congress was not ready.
It was hoped that after partition “India and Pakistan will live peacefully with each other, and that all men of goodwill on either side would be free to concentrate on improving the economic conditions of the common people,” though that did not subsequently happen.